History in the Making: Russian Invasion

Some more info from ISW:

• The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy will likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about Russia's economic stability in the long term.

 The Kremlin recently adopted several policies that aim to cut Russian government spending on wounded Russian servicemen, combat inflation, and address long-term demographic problems such as low birth rates and labor shortages. These policies demonstrate that the Russian economy is not as resilient to Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as the Russian government postures. These policies also demonstrate that the Kremlin will not be able to sustain the protracted war effort for years and decades to come while shielding Russian society from economic challenges. Consistent Western and international support for Ukraine's resistance on the battlefield will further exacerbate Russia's economic problems.

• Putin modified compensation promised for Russian servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy.
• The Kremlin's efforts to combat inflation and high interest rates are also reportedly impacting the expansion of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and prospects for mobilizing the economy.
• The Russian DIB is unlikely to match the production rate necessary to replace Russian weapons losses under these monetary policies.
• The Kremlin is also adopting policies aimed at bolstering the domestic population in the long term, signaling mounting concerns over declining demographics and labor shortages that could threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB.

Some more perspective. It clearly does not address some of the critical specifics that 02 has noted need to be defined, but I think brings up the rather critical time that will be the next few months:

Three key people have been appointed to operate the Trump defense and foreign relations portfolio.

All of them are odious in one way or another but all three of them have supported Ukraine to a point. They have largely disagreed on how Biden has managed the issue and the way its been done. Two of them at least are advocating an alternative approach based on their previous statements. 

One, the new National Security Advisor, has actually been to Ukraine during the war. Mike Waltz believes that only when Putin is faced with ‘hard metal’ does he change tack.

In essence Trump wants an end to the war, and he wants it quickly. His offer to Putin is likely based on some degree of withdrawal, some degree of territorial compromise from Ukraine, and bring it all to an end. Putin will be taken off the sanctions list and sanctions will be dropped allowing the Russian economy to appear like it might recover - however I personally think the adjustment will be vastly more difficult than Russia can handle.

Trump will be generous, but he can’t ignore European sentiment or British concerns, and he certainly cant ignore Ukraine no matter how much he might like to.

Ukraine will offer some kind of deal Trump can stomach - because he’s entirely a transactional based operator, he expects something in return for what ever he gives.

Ukraine is sitting on top of a vast sea of natural resources from oil and gas to titanium and uranium, high quality iron ore more besides. Ukraine could trade some of its interests in those resources for the aid - especially the loans - Trump could offer. 

Additionally the new administration won’t want to look weak - so it’s likely to go all in on Ukraine if Putin wont play ball, and supply it with everything it ever dreamed of to beat the Russians back and to the negotiating table.

Putin knows this is likely. He is desperate now to remove  Ukraine from Kursk so that has no bearing on negotiations and to capture as much land as he can before any discussions begin.

The problem is, its winter and he has just 67 days to manage it all in. His economic pressures are reaching boiling point and his economic projections are looking worse than expected faster than expected. 

Its looking increasingly like Putin is desperate and close to going that one step too far for too long. 

Add to this that Biden is surging the remaining $6 billion in aid so that its delivered during the very same 67 days, just when Ukraine needs it most. 

Putins position is looking strong on the ground, but you can’t help but think he’s stretching himself to the max right now, and something has to give. Ukraine is fighting hard and making the Russians pay dearly, and it has too keep on doing just that. 

Its not entirely impossible we’re at a critical juncture in the war and everything is now on a knife edge. What happens between now and Jan 20th is going to be fundamental to how this ends.

In reply to aircooled :

I don't find much to disagree with there (no idea who you're quoting, so I can't say if that's surprising or not). The idea of doubling down if Russia won't play ball is straight out of the Nixon playbook, with the nuclear alert in 1969, the mining of Haiphong harbor, and the Christmas bombing all being examples of this approach. It works, but it's inherently raising the stakes in a way the Europeans are likely to freak out about.