In reply to 02Pilot :
I read that article (which was interesting) but he never addressed questions to which I would very much like to hear his answer:
1. Why does Russia feel a "pro-American liberal democracy" is a threat to them?
2. Is that a reasonable fear?
Beer Baron said:...Third, survival is the primary motivation of all states in the international system. Survival must have top priority since the autonomy of the state is a prerequisite for the achievement of all other ends. Fourth, states are rational entities in the instrumental sense of the word, that is, they think strategically about their external situation and choose the strategy that seems to maximize their basic aim of survival. ...
These assumptions are flawed. These things can't be assumed. A state is not necessarily a monolithic body, especially not Russia. Current Russian foreign polic is very much an extension of the will of Vladimir Putin.
I would not assume that Putin's primary motivation is the survival of the Russian State. The Russian state will (or aught to) outlive him, and I have no reason to believe he is motivated by the long term health of the Russian state. Nor to assume that he is a rational actor.
If you compare Putin to previous totalitarian dictators - Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc. - their empires largely fell not long after their deaths. Their decisions were not guided by the survival of the state, but rather by maintaining power in themselves for as long as possible.
I disagree. Putin is very much motivated by the long-term survival of the Russian state in its current political construction, and in his view the expansion of Western influence into Ukraine was and remains a threat to this. His decision-making, while utilizing a different set of standards, assumptions, and priorities than we may be accustomed to, is rational and consistent with this objective.
I don't know that Stalin fits your assertion - the Soviet Union lasted 38 years after his death.
Marrying together these assumptions, Mearsheimer infers that the states soon realize that the most efficient way to guarantee survival in anarchy is to maximize their relative power with the ultimate aim of becoming the strongest power — that is, a hegemon. However, not all states can maximize their relative power simultaneously and, therefore, the state system is destined to be an arena of relentless security competition as long as it remains anarchic (Mearsheimer 2001c: Chapter 2).
This is also flawed, because expanding that power base would effectively mean bumping Russia up in the league it's playing with on the international stage. It can be the biggest kid on the form-Soviet bloc (pun intended) and flex power there. But if it hegemonizes and it's suddenly competing with NATO, the EU, and the U.S. which are exponentially more powerful than it is unless it resorts to nuclear war. Either way, it's survival is threatened.
This means that a medium power like Russia expanding its power through military conquest is *not* the logical choice for long term survival when it borders a major power like the EU/NATO and that expansion threatens those powers. So either Russia is not acting logically, or is not primarily concerned with its survival.
Again, I go back to my assertion that the "Russian State" is really an extension of Putin.
The problem here is that you are conflating NATO and the EU with sovereign states - they are not, and do not operate the same way. They are organizations that seek to provide mutual security (NATO) and consistent economic and political alignment (EU). Prior to this crisis, we have seen that there are significant differences among members that manifest themselves regularly. To use an old trope, nations have no permanent allies, only permanent interests. One of the significant miscalculations on Putin's part has been to strengthen alliance bonds in these organizations. His view, predicated on national rather than alliance interests, expected far greater division among alliance members, and indeed his military move into Ukraine was likely in part intended to widen rather than narrow the gaps between Europe and the US, and between European nations.
Beer Baron said:02Pilot said:I'm curious to understand where you think the logic fails. As I see it, this is a straightforward example of standard realist great power theory.
...
...Third, survival is the primary motivation of all states in the international system. Survival must have top priority since the autonomy of the state is a prerequisite for the achievement of all other ends. Fourth, states are rational entities in the instrumental sense of the word, that is, they think strategically about their external situation and choose the strategy that seems to maximize their basic aim of survival. ...
These assumptions are flawed. These things can't be assumed. A state is not necessarily a monolithic body, especially not Russia. Current Russian foreign polic is very much an extension of the will of Vladimir Putin.
I would not assume that Putin's primary motivation is the survival of the Russian State. The Russian state will (or aught to) outlive him, and I have no reason to believe he is motivated by the long term health of the Russian state. Nor to assume that he is a rational actor.
If you compare Putin to previous totalitarian dictators - Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc. - their empires largely fell not long after their deaths. Their decisions were not guided by the survival of the state, but rather by maintaining power in themselves for as long as possible.
Marrying together these assumptions, Mearsheimer infers that the states soon realize that the most efficient way to guarantee survival in anarchy is to maximize their relative power with the ultimate aim of becoming the strongest power — that is, a hegemon. However, not all states can maximize their relative power simultaneously and, therefore, the state system is destined to be an arena of relentless security competition as long as it remains anarchic (Mearsheimer 2001c: Chapter 2).
This is also flawed, because expanding that power base would effectively mean bumping Russia up in the league it's playing with on the international stage. It can be the biggest kid on the form-Soviet bloc (pun intended) and flex power there. But if it hegemonizes and it's suddenly competing with NATO, the EU, and the U.S. which are exponentially more powerful than it is unless it resorts to nuclear war. Either way, it's survival is threatened.
This means that a medium power like Russia expanding its power through military conquest is *not* the logical choice for long term survival when it borders a major power like the EU/NATO and that expansion threatens those powers. So either Russia is not acting logically, or is not primarily concerned with its survival.
Again, I go back to my assertion that the "Russian State" is really an extension of Putin.
Hear hear.
I stand by my take on that article and Mearsheimers reasoning.
In reply to stroker :
My assessment is that Putin feels a successful, Western-oriented democracy in a neighboring state with close cultural ties offers a dangerous model that some Russians might seek to emulate. The overthrow of the Russian puppet government by popular revolution in Ukraine would only emphasize the validity of that interpretation. The extension of NATO, with its defensive guarantees, into Ukraine would solidify the threat by strengthening the chances that a democratic government there would thrive. This is, in my view, largely about Russian domestic stability and regime survival; note that Russia has carried out a significant crackdown on internal opposition movements prior to the action in Ukraine. From Putin's point of view, I think it is a reasonable concern.
02Pilot said:I disagree. Putin is very much motivated by the long-term survival of the Russian state in its current political construction, and in his view the expansion of Western influence into Ukraine was and remains a threat to this. His decision-making, while utilizing a different set of standards, assumptions, and priorities than we may be accustomed to, is rational and consistent with this objective.
Do his actions increase or threaten the long-term survival of the Russian State?
It looks like they threaten it. It doesn't take a lot of fancy predictin' to say, "If you start something, there's gonna be something..."
The problem here is that you are conflating NATO and the EU with sovereign states - they are not, and do not operate the same way. They are organizations that seek to provide mutual security (NATO) and consistent economic and political alignment (EU).
No, I am not. They are not sovereign states but about mutual defense... of a bunch of sovereign states. His actions threaten all of those sovereign states, and he knows they have a mutual defense interest that multiplies their force. You don't need to be a tactical genius to realize that the main motivation for political and military alliance is a common threat, and he is being that.
Again, my take comes down to: this political theory *could* explain what's going on, but is hardly the only explanation, and there are simpler explanations that follow more logically.
It's entirely likely that this thinking plays *some* factor in Putin's decision making, but almost certainly is a minority of his thought process. It is a common problem with major academic theorists to over-emphasize the importance of their theories. There's a BIG difference between being *a* reason and being *the* reason.
02Pilot said:In reply to stroker :
My assessment is that Putin feels a successful, Western-oriented democracy in a neighboring state with close cultural ties offers a dangerous model that some Russians might seek to emulate. The overthrow of the Russian puppet government by popular revolution in Ukraine would only emphasize the validity of that interpretation. The extension of NATO, with its defensive guarantees, into Ukraine would solidify the threat by strengthening the chances that a democratic government there would thrive. This is, in my view, largely about Russian domestic stability and regime survival; note that Russia has carried out a significant crackdown on internal opposition movements prior to the action in Ukraine. From Putin's point of view, I think it is a reasonable concern.
This is another interesting and reasonable angle.
It fits in the theory and assertion that Russia/Putin is a logical actor that is primarily motivated by the survival of the current systems in power in that State.
However, the increased stability, prosperity, and moves towards democratization and normalized relations with Western Europe are a natural and inevitable path for a stable and healthy state in that region, and NOT "the west's fault."
Beer Baron said:02Pilot said:I disagree. Putin is very much motivated by the long-term survival of the Russian state in its current political construction, and in his view the expansion of Western influence into Ukraine was and remains a threat to this. His decision-making, while utilizing a different set of standards, assumptions, and priorities than we may be accustomed to, is rational and consistent with this objective.
Do his actions increase or threaten the long-term survival of the Russian State?
It looks like they threaten it. It doesn't take a lot of fancy predictin' to say, "If you start something, there's gonna be something..."
The problem here is that you are conflating NATO and the EU with sovereign states - they are not, and do not operate the same way. They are organizations that seek to provide mutual security (NATO) and consistent economic and political alignment (EU).
No, I am not. They are not sovereign states but about mutual defense... of a bunch of sovereign states. His actions threaten all of those sovereign states, and he knows they have a mutual defense interest that multiplies their force. You don't need to be a tactical genius to realize that the main motivation for political and military alliance is a common threat, and he is being that.
Again, my take comes down to: this political theory *could* explain what's going on, but is hardly the only explanation, and there are simpler explanations that follow more logically.
It's entirely likely that this thinking plays *some* factor in Putin's decision making, but almost certainly is a minority of his thought process. It is a common problem with major academic theorists to over-emphasize the importance of their theories. There's a BIG difference between being *a* reason and being *the* reason.
Hey Cameron, I am going back to work and I'll just let you do the talking, especially since you are largely saying what I would like to say, but better.
In reply to Beer Baron :
Yes but if you look at the report from the FSB that was contained in an article that O2 posted earlier plus the general state of politics in the western world recently, I think the took a not unreasonable gamble that the west would do little as they had with Ukraine and Georgia and Ukraine would roll over for his troops. If that gamble had of paid off, Putin probably would have felt that it increased the long term survivability of the Russian state (at least in it's current government form) but it did not.
pheller said:Putin believed he could convince the rest of the world that the economic isolation and violence in the Donbas against Russian separatists would constitute crimes against a ethnic minority.
He equated this to Hussein's treatment of the Kurds. That Russia saw a duty to intervene against a government bombing its own people.
He thought he could use the west's international intervention playbook to get away with invading an entire country and removing its leadership. This is why unilateral invasions are not a good idea.
Again, he had all the justification necessary to go to NATO and the UN and enter into the Donbas as a peacekeeper with the aims of annexing those areas or creating a new independent state. Instead he just decided to invade first, ask questions later.
Would this not be the equivalent of France invading Canada because of Quebec's claims that they were not being treated fairly by the rest of Canada?
11GTCS said:Here's an interesting car guy reason for why they may be having trouble moving their equipment:
Sounds plausible.
Interesting on the tires if you dig into the twitter link included.
I was reading a book (by Adam Savage no less) last night and a paragraph struck me in relation to this.
Adam was talking about his interpretation of the bomber crew checking their survival packs scene in Dr Strangelove. Adam interprets the bomber crew as being the most logical and reasonable characters in the whole movie, and therefore he thinks Kubrick's point was that 'one trajedy of war is that they are envisioned by idiots and executed by professionals'.
Seems to ring true here.
93EXCivic said:In reply to Beer Baron :
Yes but if you look at the report from the FSB that was contained in an article that O2 posted earlier plus the general state of politics in the western world recently, I think the took a not unreasonable gamble that the west would do little as they had with Ukraine and Georgia and Ukraine would roll over for his troops. If that gamble had of paid off, Putin probably would have felt that it increased the long term survivability of the Russian state (at least in it's current government form) but it did not.
This is entirely probable as well.
It still doesn't mean, "The West pushed Putin into this."
I still would not assert that Putin's primary interest is the long term health and stability of the Russian state. It might be, but it might not.
Beer Baron said:02Pilot said:I disagree. Putin is very much motivated by the long-term survival of the Russian state in its current political construction, and in his view the expansion of Western influence into Ukraine was and remains a threat to this. His decision-making, while utilizing a different set of standards, assumptions, and priorities than we may be accustomed to, is rational and consistent with this objective.
Do his actions increase or threaten the long-term survival of the Russian State?
It looks like they threaten it. It doesn't take a lot of fancy predictin' to say, "If you start something, there's gonna be something..."
Note that I said in its current political construction. Undertaking large-scale military action is always a throw of the dice, and I certainly think that Putin miscalculated on the Western response, but the logic of the decision - based on the recent past - was sound. The execution, however, was clumsy.
The problem here is that you are conflating NATO and the EU with sovereign states - they are not, and do not operate the same way. They are organizations that seek to provide mutual security (NATO) and consistent economic and political alignment (EU).
No, I am not. They are not sovereign states but about mutual defense... of a bunch of sovereign states. His actions threaten all of those sovereign states, and he knows they have a mutual defense interest that multiplies their force. You don't need to be a tactical genius to realize that the main motivation for political and military alliance is a common threat, and he is being that.
Again, my take comes down to: this political theory *could* explain what's going on, but is hardly the only explanation, and there are simpler explanations that follow more logically.
It's entirely likely that this thinking plays *some* factor in Putin's decision making, but almost certainly is a minority of his thought process. It is a common problem with major academic theorists to over-emphasize the importance of their theories. There's a BIG difference between being *a* reason and being *the* reason.
As I'm sure you know, all such theories attempt to be broadly useful. The question is not if it applies perfectly to one situation, but if it applies reasonably well to a majority of situations.
The problem with looking at alliances or international organizations when they are temporarily united by a crisis is that it ignores the fact that they are usually fractious and constantly under pressure from disparate national interests of their member states. Once the fighting has stopped and the immediate danger has passed, I am confident that you will see tensions rising over long-term approaches, military spending, refugee status, and a whole range of other things.
In reply to NOHOME :
Pretty much.
Only it would be like Quebec also starting a French backed violent resistance against Canadian federal oversight.
And France also being on the border of Quebec.
I relate it more to a scenario where Puerto Rico wants independence and separatists start attacking Federal offices and military installations, using Venezuelan military equipment. We basically say "eh whatever, we're cutting you off then." And then, for some reason, Venezuela decides to invade Florida. In this scenario, the likelihood if Puerto Rico being granted independence as a nation-state would be high, but there would be no reason for Venezuela to invade Florida.
As a Hard Core History Podcast fan I listened to this yesterday:
Common Sense 323 - Gas up the Cold War
Carlin has some interesting thoughts on this mess.
Look neighbor, you are ok. But I do not like your neighbor on the other side of you so I am going to kill you and your family, burn down your house and barn and shoot your dog. Nothing personal. That will make your neighbors think twice about threatening me.
Macron has reiterated his call for an EU military force. If this were to happen (and I very much doubt it will), it could be the death of NATO, as it would essentially give the US a perfect out. It's worth noting that the original post-war plan for European defense was exactly this: a European military without US participation. This failed because France would not countenance German rearmament, and without that the plan was dead in the water. The US nuclear umbrella was extended over Europe as an alternative. Under current circumstances, the US isn't going anywhere, but in a more stable European security environment, and depending on developments in East Asia, the US could make the decision to pull out if a viable alternative force - backed by both a rejuvenated German military and a French nuclear deterrent - already existed. I suspect this would be deeply unpopular with the states bordering Russia.
Here is an interesting tidbit from 10 hours ago:
Video: Ukrainian Su-24 targeted Russian military column
https://twitter.com/Shtirlitz53/status/1499285997229686785
The Su-24 is essentially the Russian equivalent of the F-111 (smaller though). They do/did have 2 squadrons of them. And yes, they did / do have a squadron of Su-25's (Warthog equivalent). Perhaps they did an Iraq and flew their air force out of the country before the invasion?
This was in the southern area and point to some interesting things: - more of the Ukrainian air forces survived. - they are able to operate of Ukraine without severe threat of being shot down.
Also possible (because they apparently have pretty horrible army / air integration) that this was a Russian plane attacking Russian forces (or they weren't attacking Russian forces of course)
Ukraine Ministry of Defense said this morning that it will now be engaging in a counteroffensive. As if to say "you aint seen anything yet."
In reply to Beer Baron :
It still doesn't mean, "The West pushed Putin into this."
I think statements like this, which I caught a bit of flak a few pages back for saying something similar, are misunderstood. It's not about assigning blame, but attributing at least a portion of the causality. If we understand causality, that is helpful. Assigning blame is rarely productive.
To use the neighbor analogy, it's like a rich neighbor flaunting his wealth ostentatiously. He is then robbed. The robber is 100% to _blame_, but there's partial causality associated with showing off one's wealth. This is part of the reason why people who are are rich, and prefer to stay un-robbed, tend to live more discreet lives.
Russia's foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the West of fixating on nuclear war, one week since Russia launched its attack on Ukraine. On Sunday, President Putin put Russia's nuclear forces on high alert, accusing the West of taking "unfriendly" steps
This guy seems to be a good source for "stupid quote of the day"
In reply to volvoclearinghouse :
This is uncomfortably close to the "she was asking for it because of how she was dressed" bullE36 M3.
In reply to volvoclearinghouse :
I don't have an informed opinion on this particular application, but I want to applaud you for recognizing this causality/fault differentiation, because I think we fail to do this way too often about way too many things.
mtn said:In reply to volvoclearinghouse :
This is uncomfortably close to the "she was asking for it because of how she was dressed" bullE36 M3.
Nothing to add but to reinforce
Mndsm said:I'd like to take this moment and say, war really does appear to bring people together. 54 pages and no one's cratered this thing yet. Color me impressed. Digital cookies for everyone
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